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The Ufa train disaster highlighted several shortcomings in both the Russian safety procedures and protocols, and also the Russian mindset.

The pipeline was constructed within 500 meters of the rail line; ordinarily this would be sufficient distance, but the gas was able to flow downhill to the tracks. When pressure dropped in the pipeline no investigative action was taken to find the obvious leak; instead, a very shortsighted action was taken to keep gas flowing, compounding the problem. Explosions caused by a gas cloud can ignite with temperatures lower than 500 degrees Fahrenheit – a stray spark or hot wheel bearing can create the explosion. This type of explosion can travel at 3 kilometers per second and reach temperatures of 4500 degrees, accounting for its extreme destructive capability.

The Ufa disaster advanced Russian knowledge and treatment of burn cases. It also marked an early large-scale use of telemedicine technology initially developed for the Russian space program, the US – USSR Space Bridge system, incorporating Intelsat and Comsat satellite communications. This allowed for US and Armenian doctors to assist in burn treatment and patient care via video, audio and fax transmissions.

Implementation of leak detection devices now follow tight mathematical models of pressure variance, with automatic shutdown mechanisms to prevent large leaks. Robot pig pipe inspectors routinely scan pipeline interiors for problems. Pipe construction now includes enamel or fusion-bond epoxy coatings and cathodic currents to prevent corrosion. These measures contribute to reduced leak incidents and severity.